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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH RASMUSSEN and
\
FAUN RASMUSSEN,
I
Plaintiffs and Appellants, /
— vs.—

> No. 4218

NEAL O. DAVIS and DORA S.
I
DAVIS,
)
Defendants and Respondents. /

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF UTAH:
Come now the plaintiffs and appellants in the above
entitled cause and respectfully petition this court to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause upon the
following grounds:
1.

That the majority opinion of this court is in

error in holding that all question of the forfeiture of the
rights of the plaintiffs and appellants under the original
contract between plaintiffs and defendants have become
moot.
2.

That the majority opinion of this court is in

error by in effect holding that plaintiffs having consented
to a rescission of a part of the original contract between
plaintiffs and defendants are precluded from maintaining this action.
3.

That the majority opinion of this court is in error

in holding that plaintiffs have waived their right to rely
on the' error of the trial court in refusing to permit the
defendant Faun Easmussen to testify that the defendant
Kenneth Easmussen told her that when they vacated the
property which they agreed to purchase, they were not
releasing their right to part of the $8000.00 down payment,
4.

That the majority opinion of this court is in

error by in effect holding that Mrs. Easmussen is precluded from claiming a part of the down payment of
$8,000.00.
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5. The majority opinion of this court is in error
in holding that the plaintiffs did not establish a jury
case as to deceit.
Kespectfully submitted,
DON MACK DALTON
E L I A S HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Appellants.

and

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

We, Don Mack Dalton and Elias Hansen, each hereby certify that the foregoing petition for a rehearing is
not filed for the purpose of delay and that each of us is
of the opinion that there is merit to the foregoing petition.
Eespectfully submitted,
DON MACK DALTON
ELIAS HASEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Appellants.

and

AEGUMENT
At the outset we find the authorities are all to the
effect that before a contract can be rescinded, it is necessary that all of the parties must consent to the rescission
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except, of course, a court may decree a rescission and
the parties may abandon a contract.
So also the authorities are all to the effect that
a contract may be rescinded or "terminated by virtue of
a contractual provision therefor, and rescission for original invalidity, failure of consideration, material
breach." Generally when a contract is rescinded there is
a right of restitution. 12 Am. Jur., page 1010, Sec. 430,
et seq. and cases cited in foot notes.
In this case the contract between the parties was
rescinded if at all by the agreement of the parties. There
is neither pleading nor evidence of any other rescission
unless it be that defendants rescinded the contract because of a breach thereof by plaintiffs in failing
to make the payment of the installment of $5000.00 which
became due on J a n u a r y 1,1952.
It is said in 12 Am. Jur. 1011 that
"Persons competent to contract can as validly agree to rescind a contract already made as
they could agree to make it originally. However
to have the effect of discharging a contract an
agreement of rescission must be a valid agreement. Two minds are required to change the terms
and conditions of a contract after it is executed.
As a contract is made by the joint will of two parties, it can be rescinded only by the joint will of
two parties. I t is obvious that one of the parties
can no more rescind the contract without the
others express or implied assent than he alone can
make it."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
The law just quoted is so elementary that we refrain from reviewing the numerous cases cited in the
foot notes to the text, however, we have read a number
of such cases am! needless to say, they support the text.
With these fundamental principles of law as a background, let us examine the holdings of the majority opinion of the court that we claim are erroneous.
POINT ONE \ NT) POINT T l rO
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS rOi'KT IS IN
ERROR IN THAT IT IS HELD THAT: ALL QUESTIONS
OF THE FORFEITURE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS UNDER THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS
HAVE BECOME MOOT, AND SUCH MAJORITY OPINION
IS IN ERROR BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE CONSENTED TO A RESCISSION OF A PART
OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS
AND DEFENDANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM MAINTAINING THIS ACTION,

The particulars in which appellants and plaintiffs
claim the majority opinion of this court is in error as to
the first and second grounds upon which they seek a
rehearing are so similar and so interwoven that they can
best be discussed together and therefore we shall so discuss them.
It is correctly stated in the dissenting opinion that
the majority opinion is bottomed on •![<< erroneous conception that the parties got together and made a so-called
rescission of the entire agreement. The evidence \< all
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to the effect that plaintiff, Kenneth Kasmussen, and defendant, Neal G. Davis, were not able to agree upon what
should be done about the down payment of $8000.00. If
there is doubt about that being the testimony of both of
the plaintiffs and appellants the attention of the court
is directed to the following pages of the Transcript: 2527, 42, 100, 112, 113, 117, 136, 138, 139, 141, 182-185.
The evidence also shows that defendant, Neal G. Davis,
repeatedly said u if you don't get off or if you stop this
sale, it will cost you a lot more than $8000.00." (Tr. 112,
114).
It will be seen from the foregoing testimony that the
plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen, not once but upon numerous occasions testified that while he and defendant,
Neal G. Davis, agreed upon the rescission of the original
contract between plaintiffs and defendants in a number
of particulars, they could not and did not agree as to
what should be done with the down payment of $8000.00.
About that being the evidence, there would seem to be
no possibility of any difference of opinion. The defendant, Neal G. Davis, and plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen,
having been unable to agree upon what should be done
with the $8000.00, it necessarily follows that resort must
be had to some method of disposing of the question of
what should be done with the $8000.00.
In the testimony of Mr. Easmussen, above referred
to, it is made clear not only that he did not and would
not consent to defendants retaining all of the $8000.00
but he also testified that it was agreed that "We were
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going to turn it to our lawyers to finish on this $8000.00."
(Tr. 42). It by no means follows that because the defendant, Davis, refused to voluntarily return part of the $8,000.00 he was not willing to submit the matter to arbitration. If, as seems obvious, the provisions of the contract,
Exhibit A, which authorizes the defendants to retain not
only the down payment of $8000.00, but also the note and
mortgage for $5000.00 in the event of any breach of the
original contract, no matter how slight, is against public
policy. Such provision is a much more glaring penalty
than that condemned by the Court in the case of Perkins
et al v. Spencer, 243 Pac. (2d) 446. I t is inconceivable
that the Davises could suffer a loss of $13000.00 because
of any breach of the original contract dated March 15,
1951 or J a n u a r y 2,1952 when the $5000.00 note and mortgage became due.
The law dealing with a state of facts such as are
here present is thus stated in 11 Am. J u r . 256:
"Whatever may be the law as to cases involving no question of illegality, it is very clear that
the general rule as to the effect of a compromise
can have no application where the claim involved
therein was wholly based upon an unlawful as
distinguished from merely insufficient consideration. This universal acknowledged rule is not
based upon any appreciative regard for the party
against whom the relief is sought, and who will
be benefited by the refusal of the court to grant
the same, but upon grounds of sound public policy.
Any contract executed in consideration of a previous illegal one, or in compromise of differences
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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growing out of it is generally speaking like that
whereon it rests, illegal and incapable of being
enforced."
The authorities go further and hold that unconscionable compromises will be relieved against by courts of
equity. 11 Am. Jur. 278. Cases in support of that text
will be found in foot notes. Needless to say a claim based
upon a provision of a contract that is a penalty and as
such unenforceable is a typical illegal claim. In the case
of Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159, 88 Pac.
708, cited in the foot note to the text above quoted will be
found collected a number of cases and authorities from
which it will be seen that the doctrine announced in the
text is of general if not uniform application. While most
of the cited cases deal with gambling contracts, the doctrine as will be seen from the authorities is not limited
to such cases.
Under the principles announced in the foregoing
authorities it may, to say the least, be doubted if, under
the facts shown by the evidence in this case, the plaintiffs had consented to forego their right to have returned
to them a p a r t of the $8000.00, such a compromise would
have been enforceable. In this case, as the evidence
shows, the defendant, Davis, stated that he had a sale
for the property and unless Mr. Easmussen surrendered
up the property, he would be sued and it would cost him
more than the $8000.00 which had been paid down on the
property. It will be seen from the text and the cases cited
in support thereof in 11 Am. J u r . 278 that courts of
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equity will grant relief against unconscionable compromises on the grounds of presumptive fraud even if there
is no actual fraud. That being so for much stronger reasons are the plaintiffs in this case entitled to relief where
they at no time agreed to relinquish their claim to the
$8000.00, the savings of a lifetime, as a part of the transaction whereby the contract was terminated.
It certainly is as much against public policy to make
it possible to retain a penalty by threats as it is against
public policy to seek unjust enrichment by contract.
POINT T H R E E
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT IS IN
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE WAIVED
THEIR RIGHT TO RELY ON THE ERROR OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN REFUSING TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF, FAUN RASMUSSEN, TO TESTIFY THAT THE DEFENDANT, KENNETH RASMUSSSEN, TOLD HER THAT WHEN THEY VACATED THE PROPERTY, WHICH THEY AGREED TO
PURCHASE, THEY WERE NOT RELEASING THEIR RIGHT
TO PART OF THE $8,000.00 DOWN PAYMENT.
The proceedings had before the court at the time the
plaintiff, Faun Rasmussen, was asked the question as
to the conversation had with her husband about what was
to become of the $8000.00 down payment will be found
on pages 182-185 of the Transcript. Mrs. Rasmussen was
asked this question: "Was anything said by your husband as to the matter of the $8000.00?" (Tr. 182). A.
"Yes Sir." The Court: "If there is no objection, I will
let her testify, if there is, I won't,"
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At the suggestion of the Court, counsel for the defendant stated: "If I had any idea what her answer would
be, I don't know whether we would object or not. We
think it is incompetent." (Tr. 183).
The record further shows that the question of the
admissibility of this proferred evidence was argued before the Court (E. 184). While the argument is not
reported, the only reasonable conclusion is that the purposes for which the evidence was offered was presented
to the court. There is no doubt but that the evidence
is hearsay, and it is extremely unlikely that anyone would
argue that the evidence was admissible for any other
purposeTIian to show one of the facts thatinduced Mrs.
Easmussen to consent to vacate the p r e m i s e ^ J i is true
that when, in the absence of the jury, counsel for plaintiffs stated what he proposed to show by the testimony
of Mrs. Easmussen, nothing further was said about the
limited purpose for which such testimony was offered,
but the Court having theretofore, in the argument had
before him, been full advised as to the purpose of the
evidence, it would have been idle to have again informed
the court of the purpose of the offer where there could
have been no other possible grounds upon which such
evidence was competent.
It will further be noted that immediately following
the ruling of the court, Mrs. Easmussen testified that at
no time at or prior to the time she moved off the Davis
property did she have any information or know that the
$8000.00 was to go to Mr. Davis. (Tr. 185).
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It is said on page 2 of the opinion that no proffer
was made under any exceptions to the hearsay rule and
any error, therefore, was waived. In support of such
holding there is cited Wigmore, Evidence Vol. 1 Sec.
18b, page 321. An examination of Wigmore on Evidence
shows that the cited page must be in error because the
subject matter referred to in the opinion is not there
discussed. Section 18b does discuss the question of the
waiver of errors in the rejection of evidence where the
one offering the evidence does something thereafter
which may be said to constitute a waiver. Under the old
rules a failure to take exception to the ruling of the court
constituted a waiver, but, of course, such rule has long
since ceased to exist in this jurisdiction.
POINT FOUR
THAT THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT IS
IN ERROR BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT MRS. RASMUSSEN IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING A PART OF
THE DOWN PAYMENT OF $8000.00.

As will be seen from the statement of the law in 12
Am. Jur. Sec. 431, page 1011 and the cases there cited,
the law is all to the effect that a contract cannot be rescinded without the express or implied assent of all of the
parties thereto. So far as we are able to ascertain that is
the uniform holding of the courts. In this case the evidence is all to the effect that Mrs. Rasmussen never consented to release any claim that she had to the $8000.00
down payment. She stated that she did not so consent.
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Moreover, it is made apparent from the testimony of
Mrs. Easmussen that the defendant, Neal Gr. Davis, deliberately saw to it that Mrs. Easmussen should not be
informed of the terms upon which the original contract
was terminated.
After the property had been returned to Mr. Davis,
some men appeared at the Easmussen home in Ephraim
and called Mr. Easmussen out of his home and there had
a conversation with him about the terms upon which he
agreed to surrender up the possession of the property.
(Tr. 186, 187). About fifteen minutes after these men
sought to secure admission from Mr. Easmussen, they
were seen in the presence of the defendant, Neal Gr.
Davis. (Tr. 187). The only reasonable inference that can
be drawn from that testimony is that Mr. Davis had at
least grave doubts about being able to show that Mr.
Easmussen had agreed to surrender all interest in the
$8000.00 and that he did not want Mrs. Easmussen to
know anything about the terms of the deal that defendant, Neal Gr. Davis, claims to have made with Mr. Easmussen touching the surrender of the possession of the
property that plaintiffs had agreed to purchase.
In the light of this behaviour of the defendant, Neal
Gr. Davis, together with the uncontradicted evidence, it is
quite apparent that if the majority opinion of this court
is permitted to become the established law of this case,
Mrs. Easmussen will be deprived of her interest in the
contract and particularly the $8000.00 without her consent and against her will. To so hold requires turning
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the clock back for two or more centuries. If, in this case,
the dealing had with Mr. Easmnssen had been had with
Mrs. Easmnssen, we believe no one would contend that
Mrs. Easmnssen would be bound by such dealings. As we
understand the modern law in this jurisdiction, a husband
has no greater right to dispose of the property rights
of his wife than does a wife have to dispose of the rights
of the husband. Certainly so far as Mrs. Easmussen
is concerned the defendant, Neal G. Davis, is seeking
to rescind or terminate the original contract without the
consent and against the will of Mrs. Easmussen. That
being so, the rights of the parties should be determined
by the general law applicable to the rescission of contracts, namely, the parties should, so far as may be
placed in status quo.
POINT FIVE
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT IS IN
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ESTABLISH A JURY CASE IN DECEIT.

It is true that the plaintiffs did not produce testimony as to the extent of the damages sustained by them
because of the false representation of the defendant, Neal
G. Davis during the negotiations leading up to the execution of the contract. To have done so would have been
of no avail. It will be seen at the beginning of the trial
that defendants so contended. (Tr. 3-4). Obviously the
plaintiffs could not recover damages when by their plead-
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ings they claim the contract was rescinded or cancelled.
The authorities teach that when a contract is rescinded
there can be no award of damages. 12 Am. J u r . Sec. 455,
page 1038 and cases there cited.
However, the fact that the defendants falsely misrepresented the facts is material to show that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in seeking some redress for the
wrong perpetrated upon them, that is sought a cancellation joL_the contract. That false statements were made
by the defendants in the course of the negotiations which_
e ^ ^ p t o the execution of Jh£_contract is ampl}^ borngby the testimony. (Tr. 8,15,18,177).
A.D^
y#r

CONCLUSION

I n conclusion plaintiffs urge that a rehearing of this
cause be granted to the end t h a t :
(a) This Court determine that the provisions of
the original contract providing for the forfeiture of the
down payment of $8000.00 and the note secured by a
Chattel Mortgage for the sum of $5000.00 payable on
J a n u a r y 2, 1952 be declared invalid because of an unconscionable penalty and that such provision was not and
could not be rendered valid and binding upon the plaintiffs under the facts disclosed by the record in this case.
(b) That plaintiff, Mrs. Easmussen, was not and
could not be deprived of her interest in the $8000.00 down
payment without her knowledge or consent and grevious
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error was committed by the majority opinion of this court
in holding that she has been deprived of such right.
(c) That the court re-examine the record in this
case in light of the authorities cited herein and particularly from the point of view that the conversations had
by the plaintiff, Mr. Rasinussen, and Mr. Davis did not
and could not lawfully constitute a ratification of the provision in the original contract that the defendants might
retain the $8000.00 down payment as liquidated damages
and particularly as to the right of the plaintiff, Faun
Rasmussen.
Respectfully submitted,

DON MACK DALTON
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
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